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Sorting, Selection, and Transformation of the Return to College Education 
in China 
 
Abstract 
 
We estimate selection and sorting effects on the evolution of the private return to 
schooling for college graduates during China’s reform between 1988 and 2002.  We pay 
special attention to the changing role of sorting by ability versus budget-constraint 
effects as China’s education policy has changed from one in which the bulk of direct 
costs are paid by government for students who pass a rigid set of test to one in which 
freedom of choice is increasingly the rule for those who can afford to pay for tuition and 
living expenses while acquiring higher education.  We find evidence of substantial 
sorting gains under the traditional system but that gains have diminished and even 
become negative as schooling choices widened and participation has become subject 
to increasing direct private costs.  We take this as evidence consistent with the 
influence of financial constraints on decisions to attend college. 
Keywords  Return to schooling, sorting gains, heterogeneity, financial constraints, 
comparative advantage, China 
JEL Codes J31, J24, O15   3
1.  Introduction and Background 
 
From about the inception of economic reform in China into the early 1990s, wage 
differences by level of skill, occupation, and/or schooling remained very narrow.  The 
Mincerian return to higher education was quite low in comparison with that in the early 
years of the Mao era and than in other industrialized and industrializing countries 
including those in some smaller transition economies, such as the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, and Bulgaria 
2.   Fleisher and Wang (2004b) show that the time path of the 
return to college education paralleled that to schooling in general.  Moreover, college 
graduates appear to have been severely underpaid relative to their contribution to 
production (Fleisher and Wang, 2004a).  There is evidence that in the past 15 years, 
returns to schooling in China have begun to increase (Zhang and Zhao, 2002; Li, 2003, 
Yang, 2004). This movement toward what probably more closely approximates a 
market-determined rate of return to schooling has paralleled rising income inequality, 
and while it has probability contributed to this growing income disparity it seems clear 
that other factors dominate.  According to Yang (1999), China in the late 1990a 
surpassed almost all countries in the world for which data are available in rising income 
inequality, and by the year 2000 China found itself with one of the highest degrees of 
income inequality in the world (Yang, 2002).   
  We are concerned with the question of how rising inequality in China is 
associated with access to educational opportunities.  The proportion of the population 
privileged to attend college has been and remains very small by almost any standard, 
despite a sharp acceleration of schooling expenditures in the past decade (Fleisher and 
Wang, 2005; Heckman, 2004). The proportion of the population aged 20 and higher with 
a college degree was less than 3.2% in 1993 and grew to 3.5% according to 1993 and 
2000 population census (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 1994 and 2002).   If 
access to higher levels of schooling is available only to the politically and geographically 
advantaged, the bulk of China’s population will be excluded from full participation in the 
growth of human capital and the income it produces. Although the end of the Mao era 
saw the influence of political considerations on access to higher education sharply 
diminish, and college admission criteria reverted to historical practice which placed a   4
very heavy weight on merit as determined by critical tests in junior- and senior high 
schools, more recently, a growing proportion of college students must fund their own 
educational expenses (Hannum, 2004; Heckman, 2004). Access to college, and an 
individual’s chances of economic gain from college, depend on the ability to achieve 
high test scores and on cognitive and noncognitive attributes produced in earlier family 
and educational contexts.  These traits, in turn, depend recursively on earlier access to 
publicly and privately supported education at lower levels as well as on the capacity to 
borrow funds from family and other sources to pay direct and indirect college costs 
(Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Hannum, 2004).   This raises the question whether 
increased public spending on education in China has enabled those who will most 
benefit themselves (and society) to achieve higher educational attainment or whether 
growing reliance on private funding through tuition and other costs have led to adverse 
sorting based on ability to pay rather than comparative advantage.  
   In this paper we focus on the returns to college education in China from the end 
of the first decade of transition to 2002, paying particular attention to sorting and 
selection issues.  We address the following questions in this paper: 
1. How have the relative importance of variables that determine the 
probability of college attendance changed?   
2. Is there evidence that sorting into college has become more or less 
efficient during reform?  
  Has the sorting gain narrowed or widened? 
  If it has widened, is this because more able students are now able 
to attend college due to reduced favoritism, or is it because lower 
levels of schooling provide worse training for college? 
  If it has widened, is there evidence of a growing gap across income 
categories, suggesting either increased importance of borrowing 
constraints or long-run income effects on ability to benefit from 
college (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002)? 
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2.  Methodology 
 
We adopt a new method that takes into account both heterogeneous returns to 
schooling and self-selection based on these returns. We first estimate the marginal 
treatment effect (MTE), which is the building block of other parameters of interest. The 
marginal treatment effect and its derivatives are estimated using the method developed 
in Heckman, Ichimura, Todd, and Smith (1998).
3, 4  
  We set up the following model of wage determination by schooling choice: 
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where a subscript indicates whether the individual is in the schooled state or the 
unschooled state. Y is income, X is observed heterogeneity, and U is unobserved 
heterogeneity in wage determination. In general, the functional forms can have a 
nonlinear component, and  10 UU ≠ . 
  The schooling choice comes from the following latent dependent model: 
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where S
* is a latent variable whose value is determined by an observable component 
() s Z µ  and a unobservable component Us.  
  In our empirical work, Z is a vector of variables that help predict the probability of 
attending college. It includes parental education, parental income, number of children, 
gender, ethnic group, and birth year dummies.  X is a vector that holds explanatory 
power on wages. In the benchmark setting, this includes experience, experience 
squared, gender, ethnic group, ownership, industry, and location. 
  In the first step, a probit model is used to estimate the  () s Z µ  function. The 
predicted value is called propensity score,  ˆ
i P , where the subscript i indicates each   6
individual. The second step adopts a semi-parametric procedure in which local linear 
regressions are used frequently. Fan (1992, 1993)
5 develops the distribution theory for 
the local linear estimator of E(Y|P=P0), where Y and P are random variables. E(Y|P=P0) 
and its derivatives can be consistently estimated by the following algorithm: 
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where  γ1 is a consistent estimator of E(Y|P=P0), and γ2 is a consistent estimator of 
() 0 |/ EY P P P ∂= ∂ . G(.) is a kernel function and  N a  is the bandwidth. We use a 
Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 0.2 in the estimation. Obviously, this algorithm is 
equivalent to applying weighted least square at each observation point, using samples 
in its “neighborhood”.  
  We estimate E(lnY|P) and E(X|P) with the above procedure. Then we run the 
double residual regression of lnY-E(lnY|P) on X-E(X|P). This is a simple OLS 
regression, except we trimmed off the smallest 2% of the estimated propensity scores 
with a biweight kernel as suggested by Heckman, Ichimura, Todd, and Smith. The result 
is consistently estimated coefficients of the linear components of the model, β. 
  Define the nonlinear component residual as U=lnY- βX. Use local linear 
regression again to estimate E(U|P) and its first derivative. This first derivative is the 
marginal treatment effect (MTE).  The average treatment effect (ATE) is a simple 
integration of the MTE with equal weight assigned to each P(Z)=Us. However, treatment 
on the treated and treatment on the untreated use the following weighting functions: 
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where f(p) is the conditional density of propensity scores. The conditioning on X is 
implicit in the above functions. All integrations are conducted numerically using simple 
trapezoidal rules. 
3.  Data 
 
The data used in this study are from the first, second, and third waves of the Chinese 
Household Income Project (CHIP) conducted in 1989 (CHIP-88), 1996 (CHIP-95), and 
2003 (CHIP-2002).  We briefly describe our use of the CHIP 95 data here. The data are 
taken from the urban component of the survey, in which 6,928 households and 21,688 
individuals in urban areas of eleven provinces were surveyed for 1995.  The survey was 
funded by the Ford Foundation and a number of other institutes.
6  In the data, annual 
earnings include regular wages, bonuses, overtime wages, in-kind wages, and other 
income from the work unit.  The hourly wage rate is calculated based on the reported 
number of working hours.  The education measure includes seven degree categories, 
ranging from below elementary school to college.  For more details, see Li (2003).    
In China, the definition of labor force is limited to ages 16 or above.  As a general 
rule, in the late 1970s, children entered elementary school at age 7 and remained there 
for 5 years; junior high school and senior high school each required 2 years.  Thus, an 
individual who was born in 1962 and started school at age 7 would be a senior in upper 
middle school in 1978 facing the choice of going to college or starting to work.  We limit 
all of our samples to individuals born after 1961 in order to avoid the complicating 
effects of educational policy during the Cultural Revolution, when many youths were 
sent to the countryside for “rectification” (or “re-education”), and colleges and even 
middle schools were either closed or nonfunctioning.  The upper birth-year cutoff 
eliminates observations born too late to have entered college in China’s education 
system (for the probit equations) and too late to have completed college (for the wage 
equations). 
Another sample limitation is based on our need for family background information 
such as parental education and parental income.  Thus, our sample is restricted to 
working individuals who are living in a household with their parents (for the probit 
equations) and who have positive earnings in 1995 (for the wage equations).  As   8
specified in the model, we only include two education groups: 3 or 4-year college and 
upper middle school.   
4.  Empirical Results 
  Propensity to Acquire a College Education 
  Table 1 presents estimates of the probit for college attendance in the three 
sample years, 1988, 1995, and 2002.  These probit equations are used to generate a 
propensity score for each observation, which is the predicted probability of college 
attendance.  The frequency distribution of propensities to attend college provides a 
reduced-form picture of increasing college attendance in China.   
    The columns (4), (8), (9), and (13) of table 1 report the mean marginal 
“propensities” attributable to each independent variable.  In our sample years 1988, 
1995, and 2002, the effect of parental schooling is highly significant, but it becomes 
quantitatively smaller over time.  The marginal impact of a one-year increase in father’s 
education on the probability of a child attending a 4-year college is 2.1 percentage 
points in 1988, 3.75 percentage points in 1995, but it drops to only 1.72 percentage 
points in 2002.  The impact of mother’s education follows the same time pattern.  The 
impact of parental income on college attendance is also significant in all periods.  The 
marginal impact of 1000 yuan/year in combined parental income increasing the 
probability of attending college is approximately 1.5 percentage points in 1988, 1 
percentage point in 1995 and 2002. 
  Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution (kernel-smoothed) of propensity scores 
for 1988, 1995, and 2002.  For each year the left panel shows the distribution for all 
observations (S=1 and S=0), while the right panel shows separate distributions for 
college attenders and nonattenders. The rightward shift of the distributions reflects 
increasing college enrollment and is consistent with the nearly 80% growth of the 
proportion of the urban population with education of college and above between 1988 
and 1995 and more than 100% growth by 1999, as documented in our data and in other 
studies as well (for example, Zhang and Zhao 2002, table 4).  In 1988, the frequency 
distribution of non-attenders is supported over a range of propensity scores from 
approximately zero through nearly 0.6; in 1995, it is supported over the range from   9
approximately zero through 0.9, and by 2002, it is supported over almost the entire 
range of propensities approaching 1.0.  The frequency distribution of attenders is 
supported over the range of propensities between approximately zero and 0.7 in 1988, 
between approximately zero and greater than 0.9 in 1995, and from about 0.1 through 
1.0 in 2002.   
  There are some interesting implications of comparing the distributions and their 
shifts over time.  Table 2 shows that in 1988, 20.8% of the sample were college 
attenders or college graduates and had a propensity score equal to or greater than 
0.324.  In 1988 14.4% of the non-attenders had scores higher than this value (yet they 
didn't go to college), while 60.4% of the attenders had scores less than this value (yet 
they did go to college).  Under the maintained hypothesis that the only unobserved 
heterogeneity is individual comparative advantage to benefit from college, and that all 
financial constraints are captured in the probit equation from which we derive the 
propensity scores, then we may infer that nonattenders with high propensity scores do 
not choose college because they know they have a comparative advantage as high-
school graduates.  This hypothetically “scholastically disadvantaged” group made up 
11.1% of the entire sample in 1988, 16.7% of the 1995 sample, and 17.5% of the 
sample in 2002; it amounted to 29.3% of nonattenders in 1995 and 47.5% in 2002.  
These comparisons, under the hypothesis that only comparative advantage accounts 
for unobserved heterogeneity is consistent with improved sorting over the years. 
  
  College Education and Earnings 
  Tables 3 and 4 contain the results of OLS, IV, and Semi-parametric IV (SPIV) 
estimation of the effect of college attendance on earnings.  Table 3 reports the results of 
benchmark estimates of wage equations in which no variables represented student 
ability are included as regressors.  The benchmark OLS estimates for 1988 and 1995 
are commensurate with those reported elsewhere for comparable time periods and 
increase gradually through 2002 (See Fleisher and Wang, 2004, for estimates and a 
summary of other studies)
7. The IV estimates of the return to college education (all of 
which use the propensity score as the instrument for college attendance) are 
considerably higher than the OLS estimates in the benchmark regressions.     10
  Estimates based on regressions containing a proxy for student ability are 
reported in Table 4.  When either parental education or parental income variables are 
used to proxy for ability, the OLS estimates of the return to schooling are approximately 
equal to those reported in Table 3, with the exception of the estimate reported by 
Heckman and Li (2004), for the year 2000.  Their OLS estimated return, with parental 
income used as an ability proxy, is much higher than their benchmark OLS estimate; 
however it is about the same as the OLS estimates we obtain from the CHIP data for 
the years 1988 and 1995 in both the benchmark formulations and in the regressions 
that include an ability proxy.  When parental education is used as a proxy for student 
ability in the IV earnings equations, the estimated coefficient for college attendance is 
much higher than the OLS estimates for the years 1988 and 1995, and 2002.  However, 
when parental income is used as a proxy for ability, the IV estimates are approximately 
the same as the OLS estimates in 1988 and 1995, but higher in 2002 (although much 
lower than when parental education is the ability proxy)
8.  
  We turn now to our estimates of returns to schooling based on SPIV estimation.  
The distinguishing feature of the SPIV procedure is the capacity to retrieve estimates of 
the marginal treatment effect (MTE) of college education that allow for heterogeneity in 
the return to schooling.  Figure 2 depicts the MTE of college education in China for the 
years 1988, 1995, and 2002.  For each year we also compare the MTE from two 
specifications of the wage equation.  Figure 3 places these two MTE curves for each 
year together so that the effect of including an ability proxy can be seen more clearly.  
Inclusion of an ability proxy in the local linear regressions simply results in an almost 
parallel upward shift of the MTE curve.  The shape is not affected across the Us 
dimension.  
    The heterogeneity model postulates that those who attend college do so 
because they benefit more than those who choose not to attend. It is important to 
emphasize that this assumption does imply decisions made strictly in terms of expected 
income streams.  It is consistent with someone choosing not to attend college because 
financial or psychic costs are expected to outweigh financial gains (CHV 2003). 
However, if all financial and psychic costs of college attendance are reflected in the 
propensity score, the model implies the MTE function is monotonically negatively sloped   11
and represents a demand for college education in the sense that a decline in the 
marginal financial cost of college attendance is required to induce greater college 
attendance, cet. par.  The MTE curves for 1988 support this hypothesis, but they are 
inconsistent with it in 1995 and, dramatically so, in 2002.  The 1995 MTE curves reach a 
minimum in the middle of the Us range and then curve back up toward larger values of 
Us.   The 2002 MTE curves are monotonically increasing in Us.  These shapes are 
inconsistent with the joint hypothesis that only comparative advantage accounts for 
unobserved heterogeneity and that the probit estimates of propensity to attend college 
fully capture financial constraints in 1995 and 2002.  They do not suggest improved 
sorting according to comparative advantage over the years.  They are consistent with 
another hypothesis:  that the wage gain to a college education among those least likely 
to attend college would be higher than among some individuals more likely to attend.   
They are consistent with some barrier to college attendance in China other than lack of 
ability to benefit financially, e.g. psychic costs or unobserved financial barriers (CHV 
2004, p. 25).   
     
4.  Conclusion 
•  The OLS return to college education increased between 1988 and 1995, 
but increased sharply between 1995 and 2002.  In the year 2002, it 
remained somewhat small by international standards, approximately 7.1% 
per year of college. 
•  IV estimates of the return to college are sensitive to the use of a proxy for 
ability.  When parental income is used as a proxy for ability in the local 
nonlinear regression wage regression, IV estimated returns to college 
were unchanged between 1988 and 1995 but more than doubled between 
1995 and 2002.  When parental schooling is used as a proxy for ability, 
the IV estimated returns to college are higher than when parental income 
is used and decreased between 1988 and 1995 and increased sharply 
between 1995 and 2002.   12
•  The time pattern of the average treatment effect (ATE) of college 
education is similar to that of the IV estimates.  In terms of the percentage 
return per year of college, it is 12.8% in 1988, 11.85 in 1995, and 23.2% in 
2002. 
•  When parental education is used as a proxy for ability, the estimate of 
heterogeneous return to college for college attenders (TT) falls from 
27.6% in 1988 to 13.3% in 1995 and then rises to 16.1% in 2002.  The 
counterfactual return to college attendance for those who did not attend 
(TUT) rises substantially, from 7.8% in 1988 to 10.6% in 1995, and to 
32.3% in 2002. 
•   When parental income is used as a proxy for ability, TT is smaller in all 
three years and also declines substantially between 1988 and 2002; 
similarly, TUT is always smaller when parental income is used as the 
ability proxy and rises. 
•  Sorting gain declines substantially, becoming negative in 2002.  This 
evidence is consistent with the increasing importance of unmeasured 
financial constraints on college attendance and is the crux of our 
continued research. 
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Table 1: Propensity Estimates   
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Variable Param. t-ratios
 
p-values 
(4) 
Mean 
Marginal
 Effect  Param.t-ratiosp-values
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Mean 
Marginal 
Effect 
(9) 
Mean 
Marginal  
Effect Param. t-ratio  p-values
(13) 
Mean 
Marginal 
Effect 
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BY1966 -0.4494-2.756   0.003  -0.1191  0.0507 0.2882 0.3866  0.02   0.4366  1.5641  0.059  0.163 
BY1965 -0.4114-2.536   0.0057  -0.1091  0.032 0.1823 0.4277 0.0126   0.2397  0.8472  0.1985  0.0895 
BY1964 -0.2138-1.4434  0.0746  -0.0567  0.0489 0.2662 0.3951  0.0192   0.4112  1.3665  0.086  0.1535 
BY1963 -0.2327-1.503   0.0665  -0.0617  0.0479 0.2253 0.4109  0.0188   -0.1613 -0.4929 0.3111  -0.0602 
BY1962           0.3006 1.3692 0.0856  0.1182   0.2677  0.8435  0.1996  0.0999 
Notes:  The dependent variables is a dummy variable = 1 for graduated from college.  The independent variables are, respectively, father’s 
education in years, mother’s education in years, mother’s and father’s annual income in 1000 yuan per year, including cash and in-kind benefits,   18
number of children in family of origin, a dummy variable = 1 if respondent is male, dummy variable =1 if ethnicity is not Han Chinese, and dummy 
variables for birth year. 
*The coefficient is for the variable parental income. 
Table 2: Comparison of Propensity Distributions 
 1988  1995  2002 
Proportion of sample who are college attenders or graduates  20.8%  42.7% 63.0%
Cutoff Propensity  0.324  0.480  0.588 
Proportion of attenders with scores less than the cutoff  60.4%  39.9% 27.6%
Proportion of attenders with low scores as proportion of sample  12.6%  17.0% 17.4%
Proportion of nonattenders with scores greater than the cutoff  14.4%  29.3% 47.5%
Proportion of nonattenders with high scores as proportion of sample 11.1%  16.7% 17.5%
Note:  The cutoff percentage is the propensity score that corresponds to the cumulative frequency of the total sample that 
were attending or had graduated from college in the sample year. 
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Table 3: Benchmark regression estimates and treatment effect estimates 
Parameter  CHIP88 CHIP95 CHIP02 H&L  (2000) 
OLS  0.1986 0.2307 0.3142 0.0856 
IV
  0.3435 0.3724 0.9812 0.2192 
ATE  0.2556 0.3473 0.8248 0.2321 
TT  0.7868 0.3883 0.3943 0.1909 
TUT  0.1147 0.3135 1.4958 0.2679 
Bias  
= OLS - ATE 
-0.0569 -0.1166 -0.5106 -0.1465 
Selection Bias 
= OLS - TT 
-0.5882 -0.1576 -0.0800 -0.1053 
Sorting Gain  
= TT - ATE 
0.5312 0.0410 -0.4306  -0.0412 
TT - TUT  0.672  0.0748  -1.102  -0.077 
 
Note:  Dependent variable is monthly wage in 1988, hourly wage in 1995 and 2002.  OLS regressors are a dummy 
variable for college attendance, experience, experience squared, a dummy variable = 1 if male, a dummy variable = 1 if 
ethnicity not Han Chinese, The IV regression uses predicted college attendance based on the propensity score as an 
instrument.  The treatment effect estimates are based on results from local linear regression. 
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Table 4:  Regression estimates with ability proxy included and treatment effect estimates 
Parameter CHIP88  CHIP88 CHIP95  CHIP95 CHIP02  CHIP02 H&L  (2000) 
Ability proxy  fedu medu  fwage mwage fedu medu fwage mwage fedu medu  fwage mwage parental income
OLS 0.2029  0.1985  0.2127  0.2114 0.2814  0.2687 0.2929 
IV
*  0.8494 0.2033  0.5963 0.1995 1.4711  0.4764 0.5609 
ATE 0.6239  0.1854  0.5660  0.1889 1.3044  0.4084 0.4336 
TT 1.6530  0.5817  0.6460  0.2215 0.8168  0.2025 0.5149 
TUT 0.3510  0.0804  0.5002  0.1621 2.064  0.7293 0.3630 
Bias 
= OLS - ATE 
-0.4211  0.0130 -0.3533  0.0226 -1.023  -0.1397  -0.1407 
Selection Bias 
= OLS - TT 
-1.4502  -0.3832 -0.4333  -0.0100 -0.5354  0.0662  -0.2220 
Sorting Gain 
= TT - ATE 
1.0291  0.3963 0.0800  0.0326 -0.4876  -0.2059  0.0813 
TT - TUT  1.302  0.5013  0.146  0.0594  -1.25  -0.527  0.155 
 
Note:  Dependent variable is monthly wage in 1988, hourly wage in 1995 and 2002.  OLS regressors are a dummy 
variable for college attendance, experience, experience squared, a dummy variable = 1 if male, a dummy variable = 1 if 
ethnicity not Han Chinese..  The IV regression uses predicted college attendance based on the propensity score as an 
instrument.  The treatment effect estimates are based on results from local linear regression.   22
Figure 1:  Propensity to Attend College Frequency Distributions 1988, 1995 
and 2002 
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Figure 2: Marginal Treatment Effects 1988, 1995, and 2002 
 
 
Left side are benchmarks, which do not contain ability proxies.  Right side include 
parental education as ability proxy.   24
Figure 3: MTE Curves with and without ability proxies (parental education) 
 
Upper curves reflect inclusion of parental education as ability proxies.   25
                                                                                                                                                       
 
1 We are grateful to Pedro Carneiro, Joe Kaboski, and James Heckman for their 
invaluable help and advice and to Sergio Urzúa for providing help and advice with 
software codes.  Quheng Deng contributed invaluable research assistance. 
* Corresponding author. 
2 For China See Zhang and Zhao (2002), Li (2003), and references cited in Fleisher 
and Wang (2001).  For other countries, see Munich, Svejnar, and Terrell (2000), 
Orazem and Vodopivec, 1995, and Jones and Ilayperuma, 1994. 
3 Econometrica 66, 5 (Sept. 1998): 1017-1098. 
4 These derivatives include average treatment effect (ATE), treatment on the treated 
(TT), treatment on the untreated (TUT), bias, selection bias, and sorting gain. 
5 Fan (1992): Journal of the American Statistical Association 87: 998-1004. Fan 
(1993): The Annals of Statistics 21: 196-216. 
6 The CHIP-95 data are available to the public at the Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR). 
7 The OLS estimate of return to schooling in 2000 reported by Heckman and Li 
(2004) is problematic.  In their benchmark regression, they report an OLS estimate 
of 0.0856 for four years of college, implying an annual rate of return of only 2.1%, 
which is much lower than estimated returns in 1988 and 1995; in an OLS regression 
that includes parental income as a proxy for ability, they report an estimate of 0.2929 
for four years of college, implying an annual rate of return of 6.6%, about the same 
as in 1988 and 1995.  Moreover, the OLS estimates reported by Heckman and Li 
(2004) are low in comparison to those obtained in other research.  Giles, Park, and 
Zhang (2004) use data for the year 2000 obtained from the China Urban Labor 
Survey conducted in 2001.  The data cover the cities of Fuzhou, Shanghai, 
Shenyang, Wuhan, and Xian.   Using these data, they obtain an estimate for return 
to four years of college education of approximately 0.52, which converts to 
approximately11% annual rate (personal conversation with John Giles). 
8 Heckman and Li (2004), however, report an IV estimate of return to schooling 
equal to 0.5609 for college graduates based on a regression in which parental   26
                                                                                                                                                       
 
income is used as a proxy for ability.  This is nearly twice as large as their reported 
OLS estimate.  
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